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This paper provides a report of climate risk management for the city of Brisbane between 1976 and 2011.
Using the evidence presented by the Commission of Inquiry established to investigate extreme ﬂooding
events across Queensland in 2010–2011, this paper describes Brisbane City Council’s ongoing attempts to
derive a ‘Q100’ ﬂood risk management metric as a means to determine urban planning policy. The
evidence presented by the Commission demonstrates how the normative decisions that underpinned the
Council’s derivation of Q100 and which sought to maximise urban development in the Brisbane River
ﬂoodplain were in direct conﬂict with State government's concurrent priorities relating to water re-
sources supply and ﬂood risk management. This account of conﬂicting climate risk management stra-
tegies by local and state government demonstrates how the derivation of technical expert evidence can
become politicised to align with conﬂicting priorities, and are then used in a ‘scientised’ environmental
planning process.
& 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1 Q100 is the term for the commonly used Annual Exceedance Probability1. Introduction
This paper describes the derivation of ﬂood risk management
planning guidelines by local government in Brisbane, Australia
between 1976 and 2011. This crucial period in the history of ﬂood
risk management practice in Brisbane and the surrounding areas
of southeast Queensland was the principal focus of investigations
undertaken by the 2011 Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry
[26] and is examined here to demonstrate how technical evidence
can disguise political decisions and be used in a ‘scientised’ pro-
cess of environmental decision making [31]. As this paper de-
monstrates, Brisbane City Council's (BCC) use of hydrologic/hy-
draulic modelling and probabilistic ﬂood risk metrics has dis-
guised political prioritisation concerning urban planning density
and the relative priority given to the conﬂicting pursuits of water
resource supply versus ﬂood risk management. This paper de-
monstrates how BCC's use of probabilistic ﬂood risk metrics to
dictate urban planning guidelines is based on politically-motivated
assumptions that have sought to maximise urban development in
the Brisbane River ﬂoodplain at the expense of communities' re-
silience to extreme ﬂooding events. BCC’s metrics and the as-
sumptions underpinning them have, thus far, proven to be tech-
nically inadequate for the purposes of ﬂood risk management
because they have conﬂicted with Queensland State Government’s
political priorities for the operation of the Wivenhoe Dam, astd. This is an open access article uexempliﬁed by the ﬂooding events of 2010–2011.
Using the reports of the Queensland Floods Commission of
Inquiry established in 2011, in the aftermath of the worst ﬂooding
events in this region for more than 35 years [26,27], Section 2 of
this paper brieﬂy summarises the climate risk management chal-
lenges facing the city of Brisbane. I describe the ﬂooding events of
2010–2011 which led to the establishment of the Commission of
Inquiry, as well as their historical context in relation to natural
resource management and urban planning priorities in Brisbane
since 1976. Section 3 describes the Commission’s investigation into
BCC's attempts to derive an accurate Q100 metric1 between 1976
and 2004 and the political inﬂuences upon this assessment pro-
cess apparent from the Commission’s reports. Finally, the paper
discusses the Commission’s ﬁndings using the concept of ‘scien-
tised’ decision making for public policy and planning.2. Background: climate risks for southeast Queensland
The sub-tropical climate of Brisbane and surrounding areas of
southeast Queensland consists of wet and dry seasons as well as
being inﬂuenced by non-annual variability associated with the Elnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
derived to inform ﬂood risk management practices in Australia. It denotes a
ﬂooding event that is likely to recur once every one hundred years and is therefore
considered synonymous with a 1% probability of recurring annually [5,26: p. 40].
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decadal Paciﬁc Oscillation. What results is a climate regime char-
acterised by unusually high levels of uncertainty and frequent and
contrasting extremes of ﬂooding, drought, cyclones, storms and
bushﬁres [21]. State and local governments in this region have
long been preoccupied with the need to manage persistent and
contrasting climate extremes [17]. Indeed, it may be argued that
Queensland’s climate has been an important determinant of its
colonial history and subsequent socio-economic and political de-
velopment [19,40,41]. Southeast Queensland, a planning ‘region’
for the purposes of Queensland's state planning policy [25], is one
of Australia's fastest growing regions [2,25]. Comprising a total of
eleven local government councils (Fig. 1), seven of these have,
since the 1970s, begun to merge into a single urban agglomeration
which concentrates approximately 90% of the region's 3.05 million
inhabitants within an area comprising about 20% of its 22,420 km2
area [1,36,38]. With an increasingly urbanised, expanding, coastal
population stretching 200 km from the Sunshine Coast in theFig. 1. Southeast Qunorth to the Gold Coast in the south, southeast Queensland has
been identiﬁed as a potential climate change ‘vulnerability hot-
spot’ by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [36,14: p.
530].
In December 2010 and January 2011, an unusually strong La
Nina event and prolonged intense monsoonal rainfall over the
preceding months caused extreme ﬂooding in the Brisbane River
catchment, Lockyer Valley, and surrounding areas of southeast
Queensland. The ﬂooding resulted in the deaths of 35 people and
an estimated $5 billion worth of damage [28,27: 20]. These events
were preceded by a prolonged drought in the State of Queensland
between 2001 and 2009, while the last major ﬂooding event in
Queensland on a par with the extremes of 2010–2011 occurred in
1974 [16: p. 14,27: p. 24].
The La Nina event of 2010–2011 and its associated rainfall were
forecast by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, which briefed
the Queensland Government of the potential for heavy rainfall in
advance of the ﬂoods [27: p. 46]. In the aftermath, the Queenslandeensland [38].
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quiry into state and local governments’ disaster risk management
and climate adaptation provisions. The Commission's interim and
ﬁnal reports focused much of their analysis on the operation of the
Wivenhoe and Somerset dams [27]. As described by Heazle et al.
[13] these dams fulﬁl the dual and conﬂicting purposes of ﬂood
risk and water resource management whereby water stored be-
hind the dam serves the water resource needs of southeast
Queensland while at the same time the dams were designed and
can be operated to allow for the reduction of ﬂooding in the
Brisbane and Ipswich ﬂood plains by holding back water in times
of heavy and persistent rainfall [27: p. 39]. As a result, the opera-
tion of these dams necessitates normative, political decisions in a
zero-sum game concerning the relative priority given to the
management of the opposing risks from ﬂooding and drought [13].
However, while political decisions about the dual and con-
ﬂicting roles played by the dams directly inﬂuenced the scale of
the ﬂooding experienced in 2010–2011 [27: p. 46, 51], this paper
demonstrates that these political decisions also indirectly inﬂu-
enced the level of exposure of communities in Brisbane to ﬂooding
extremes during this period. This is because, as will be explained
here, the normative decisions associated with state government’s
management of these dams was not congruent with the normative
decisions underpinning BCC's estimation of ﬂood risk for the city
and their subsequent derivation of planning regulations.
2.1. Brisbane City Council's priorities for urban planning and natural
resource management
To understand the political and policy making pressures upon
state and local government in Queensland, and therefore the po-
tential motives for political inﬂuence upon the normative deci-
sions required in the derivation of Brisbane's Q100 ﬂood risk
management metric, I describe here some historical context re-
lating to BCC's management of natural resources and urban plan-
ning for Brisbane.
Between 2001 and 2009, southeast Queensland suffered the
most severe drought in the region’s recorded history [29]. The so-
called Millennium Drought, which affected most of the southeast
of Australia, was actually two separate droughts, in 2002–2003
and 2006–2007, both caused by El Nino events. In the intervening
years the region had experienced below-average wet season
rainfall thus exacerbating their effect [3]. Such was the scale of this
extended drought period that by mid-2007 southeast Queens-
land’s combined water supply dropped to just 20% of its storage
capacity and by August of 2007, the Wivenhoe Dam was at 15% of
its full supply capacity [32]. In response, Queensland State Gov-
ernment and BCC initiated a series of water use restriction policies
and infrastructure investment initiatives to dramatically reduce
both water consumption and waste [29,34,12]. Under these cir-
cumstances, it seems unsurprising that state government were
subsequently reluctant to reduce water levels behind the dams
with the onset of the La Nina conditions that caused the ﬂoods of
2010–2011 [27: p. 46, 47].
In the midst of these water resource and ﬂood risk manage-
ment pressures, state and local government were also seeking to
manage a period of unprecedented population growth in the
southeast Queensland region over the preceding decades. This
growth had exacerbated the pressures upon water supply during
the Millennium Drought [34] and, I argue, also provided sufﬁcient
motive for BCC to continually resist changes to its urban planning
ﬂood risk management control levels, as determined by the esti-
mation of the Q100 metric for Brisbane.
Brisbane has one of the lowest levels of urban density of over
50 comparable US, Canadian and Australian cities [33]. Perhaps as
a result of decades of unchecked urban sprawl, each of Brisbane’scity plans since 1976 have placed a strategic priority upon inner
city redevelopment, consolidation and/or increased density of
particular inner city suburbs [4,6,33,37,15,35]. For instance, the
Brisbane suburb of West End, which has long been zoned for
‘character residential’ or ‘low density residential’ buildings has, in
recent years, had signiﬁcant portions rezoned as high density re-
sidential areas [4,6,33]. This rezoning is noteworthy because it has
occurred despite many of these locations being in areas of high
ﬂood risk; under the 2014 City Plan extensive portions of these (as
well as lower density) residential zones have been designated as
being either likely or very likely to ﬂood, with the possibility of
deep and/or fast moving water [6]. It seems reasonable to assume
that any signiﬁcant upward adjustment of Q100 would likely ex-
pand these ﬂood risk areas of the city [8].
When considering BCC's priorities for managing ﬂood risk in
the period 1976–2011, I argue that the Council had three distinct
(though not mutually exclusive) groups of stakeholders to ap-
pease: property developers, property owners (residential, com-
mercial and industry), as well as the city's electorate more gen-
erally. The designation of ﬂood risk controls based on Q100 would
impact upon the concerns of each of these groups. For new urban
developments, the apparently conﬂicting designation of “high
density residential” in high ﬂood risk areas may not have posed a
radical engineering or logistical impediment for property devel-
opers, assuming they could meet the appropriate ﬂood risk man-
agement planning controls. However, such controls may none-
theless have signiﬁcant costs for developers associated with the
provision of adequate stormwater sewerage and other ﬂood risk
management measures [37].
Perhaps of greater concern is that high ﬂood risk urban areas
are likely to be problematic in terms of Council members' elect-
ability by home and business owners, as well as with residents of
these locations more generally. In the aftermath of the 2010–2011
Brisbane ﬂoods, many inner city suburbs were inundated, causing
median property prices in the city to drop in the 12 months fol-
lowing the ﬂoods by almost 24% [18]. A number of these areas
regained their property prices in due course [9], however in other
areas of the city, and in poorer areas in particular, house prices
have been slower to recover as home-owners have been unable in
many cases to repair ﬂood damage [7,10].
These ongoing pressures upon BCC to manage ﬂood risk for the
communities they represent provided, I argue, considerable dis-
incentive to expand ﬂood risk zones beyond their existing bounds
and, during a period which saw considerable urban redevelop-
ment, consolidation and densiﬁcation (i.e., 1976–2011), such dis-
incentives became increasingly acute. As discussed in the follow-
ing section, the Commission of Inquiry's investigation suggested
that BCC have, at best, failed to coordinate their political priorities
with Queensland State Government, and at worst, may have de-
liberately avoided adopting a higher, though more realistic, Q100
assessment for the purposes of its development control levels.3. Brisbane's ﬂood risk management strategy: the assessment
of Q100
The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry's interim and
ﬁnal reports [26,27] tell the ofﬁcial record of how ﬂood risk
management strategy was developed for Queensland State Gov-
ernment’s operation of the Wivenhoe and Somerset Dams and in
the derivation of BCC's planning scheme. Unfortunately, no
members of Brisbane City Council’s Natural Environment, Water
and Sustainability Branch were permitted by ruling council
members to be interviewed about BCC's past or current estimates
of Q100, about their understanding of the operation of the Wi-
venhoe Dam or their climate adaptation strategies, for the
Fig. 2. Timeline of ﬂood risk management by Brisbane City Council.
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Queensland State Government or Seqwater (the dam operator)
were willing to be interviewed in the course of this research. As a
result, conclusions regarding the norms and motives of the Council
are principally surmised from the testimony and investigation
described by the Commission of Inquiry's reports [26,27]. Given
the reluctance of both local and state governments2 to provide
further testimony in this regard, these reports serve as the2 This reluctance can be explained in large part by the intense media scrutiny
placed on these organisations in the aftermath of the Queensland ﬂoods, particu-
larly during the Commission’s investigation, as well as perhaps by the controversial
nature of BCC's and Queensland State Government’s majority Liberal-National
Party’s position on climate risk management which is largely sceptical of climate
change science [30,39].principal point of reference for the case-study described here.3
Brisbane’s ﬂood risk management strategy follows a risk-based
decision making approach that utilises Annual Exceedance Prob-
abilities (AEPs) as metrics of ﬂood risk. According to the Com-
mission of Inquiry, AEPs have been used in Queensland since the
1970s to provide an indication of the probability of ﬂooding at
speciﬁc locations [26: p. 48]. A 1% AEP, also known as ‘Q100’, in-
dicates the degree of ﬂooding that will recur on average every 100
hundred years and is therefore considered synonymous with a 1%
probability of occurrence [5,26: p. 40]. The derivation of Q1003 The Commission's investigation relied on both sworn testimonies and doc-
umentary evidence and constitutes a deﬁnitive account of the events leading up to
the 2011 ﬂoods [26,27].
P. Tangney / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 14 (2015) 496–503500levels through hydrologic/hydraulic modelling is often highlighted
for a speciﬁc location for the purposes of the communication and
discussion of urban planning and development (e.g., at the Port
Ofﬁce gauge in Brisbane) [26,27], but Q100 levels are derived at
various points across a catchment. This technical assessment al-
lows local government councils to specify through their planning
schemes where, at what elevation on the ﬂoodplain and what kind
of development may be permitted in ﬂood risk-prone areas. From
1976 to the present, BCC has relied on a Q100 level of 3.7 metres
measured at the Port Ofﬁce gauge in Brisbane [6,26: p. 48]. During
this time the Council has received multiple estimates from expert
engineers of the Q100 level, ranging from 3.16 to 5.34 metres. Yet,
the level of 3.7 metres adopted in 1976 and based on the peak
height that would have been reached in the 1974 ﬂoods if it had
been mitigated by the Wivenhoe Dam,4 was still in use by the time
of the ﬂooding events of 2010–2011, and is still in use today [6,26:
p. 48] (Fig. 2).
The ﬁrst study to establish a more accurate Q100 than the
original estimate was commissioned in 1996 and delivered to BCC
in 1998 with a best estimate of 5.34 metres. However, BCC’s Water
Resources manager had reservations about the method used and
commissioned a review of this estimate by an expert hydrologist.
Amongst other technical reservations, the Water Resources man-
ager had questioned the precautionary assumptions made in the
derivation of the estimate that the Wivenhoe and Somerset dams
would be at 100% of full supply level5 at the beginning of any ﬂood-
ing event [26: p. 49,,[8]. The expert reviewer agreed with BCC's
concerns and concluded that 5.34 metres was an overestimate:
“conservative assumptions in key input variables point to the
likelihood that the magnitude of the Q100 obtained in this Study
[sic] is an over-estimate” [22: p. 26, 27].
BCC then commissioned a second estimate to address these
concerns. Produced by in-house experts in June 1999, this second
estimate gave a Q100 of 5.0 metres [8]. BCC's Water Resources
manager was again unhappy with this ﬁgure, since its derivation had
not adequately addressed the concerns of the reviewer of the original
estimate. A third estimate was commissioned and produced in De-
cember 1999 with a Q100 of 4.7 metres, and again the Water Re-
sources manager was unhappy with this assessment [26: p. 49].
Strangely, neither the Commission's report [26] nor a 2003
expert review panel report on past Brisbane ﬂood studies [22]
reveal the precise reasoning for why the latter two assessments
were considered inadequate, however both intimate that – much
like the ﬁrst estimate – BCC's concerns were due, in large part, to
the conservative assumptions made about the operation of the
Wivenhoe and Somerset dams and, in part, due to other techni-
cally inappropriate assumptions relating to rainfall runoff variables
used in the models [26: p. 49,,[22]. The expert reviewer of these
estimates noted that:
“the amount of ﬂood storage in these dams is very signiﬁcant
relative to design runoff values, so the correct simulation of these
dams (and their operation during events) is of paramount im-
portance” [22: p. 9].
Although the Commission's reports are unclear about BCC's
precise reasoning for rejecting the second and third estimates, a
report submitted by its team of in-house experts responsible for
the second Q100 estimate clearly retains and justiﬁes the original
contractors' precautionary assumptions about the operation of the4 The Wivenhoe Damwas completed in 1985 and as will be explained here, is a
fundamental determinant of ﬂood risk and exposure along the Brisbane River.
5 That is, that the ﬂood mitigation potential of the dams would be at its lowest
and conversely the water resource potential would be at its highest.Wivenhoe Dam [8: p. 7]. BCC's Water Resources manager was
clearly unconvinced by their rationale and made no adjustment to
Brisbane's Q100 level or to its planning scheme on the back of
these ﬁrst three estimates as he considered that further work on
the city's ﬂood study was needed [26: p. 49].
Given their dissatisfaction with these three previous estimates,
BCC decided to consult the state Department of Natural Resources
and Mines, the Bureau of Meteorology and the Southeast Queensland
Water Corporation6 at a workshop held in October 2000. The purpose
of the workshop was to decide on a most appropriate method for the
estimation of Q100. Participants at the workshop were informed that
new studies were being commissioned by the state department that
would clarify the government’s position (concerning the relative
priority given to water resources versus ﬂooding) in relation to likely
releases from the Wivenhoe Dam in the event of major ﬂooding, and
which would produce a Q100 estimate closer to the original estimate
of 3.7 metres.
While the results of this study were expected in December
2000, the Council decided to put work on their updated ﬂood
study on hold. In the event, the department’s analysis was not
made available to the Council until June 2003, despite some in-
tense media scrutiny in the intervening period due to the ongoing
absence of an up-to-date Q100 estimate [26: p. 49]. Because of this
public scrutiny, the Lord Mayor of Brisbane at the time, commis-
sioned an independent review panel to investigate the results that
would eventually be provided by the state department, and to
oversee a ﬁnal, deﬁnitive Q100 estimate for Brisbane [22]. Notably,
the review panel was chaired by the expert who had reviewed the
original study in 1998, while the contractor commissioned to un-
dertake the modelling work for the estimate was the same com-
pany that had been commissioned to undertake the ﬁrst (rejected)
estimate of 5.34 metres.
More intriguing still, the Commission reveals how the terms of
reference for the review panel included the sentence:
Even if the Q100 changes from 6800 m3/s [i.e., 3.7 metres at the
Port Ofﬁce gauge], it is likely that the Development Control Level
will remain the same as is currently used in the Brisbane City Plan
[26: p. 50,22: p. 25].
Testimony by a senior engineer in the water resources branch of
the Council who wrote these terms of reference testiﬁed to the
Commission of Inquiry that he intended this statement to mean that
if the Q100 level was found to be lower than the existing level,
planning control levels would not be correspondingly lowered [26: p.
50]. The Commission appears to have accepted this testimony at face
value. Yet, given their rejection of three prior estimates, the political
and planning ramiﬁcations of a ﬁnal Q100 estimate that was con-
siderably higher than 3.7 metres must also have been considered by
BCC and was likely to have been an unattractive proposition for their
management of a rapidly expanding city. As discussed in Section 2.1
above, given the increasing levels of urban development along the
Brisbane River downstream of the Wivenhoe Dam, it seems reason-
able to conclude that any new estimate of Q100 considerably higher
than the current value of 3.7 metres would result in signiﬁcant im-
pacts on property values. Those buildings once designed and built to
a safe standard of ﬂood risk protection would no longer be deemed
adequate under a revised planning scheme. Further, any upward
adjustment of Q100 might also provide a potentially signiﬁcant im-
pediment to property developers seeking to invest in rezoned inner
city areas at increasing risk of ﬂooding.
It seems reasonable to assume that BCC's engineer, when
writing the terms of reference, would understand that any6 Also known as Seqwater, is responsible for the operation of the Wivenhoe
and Somerset dams.
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higher than 3.7 metres, even when using less precautionary as-
sumptions about the operation of the dams. It seems worthy to
note, in the context of these terms of reference, that the supposed
technical inadequacies of previous models and BCC's preferred
assumptions regarding the operation of Wivenhoe Dam during a
ﬂooding event, aligned to avoid the obvious political and economic
ramiﬁcations that are likely to have resulted from a more pre-
cautionary assessment of Q100.
The Commission's report describes how the review panel were
given ﬁve weeks to produce their Q100 estimate upon receiving the
necessary data from the state department. The company commis-
sioned to undertake the technical works were instructed not to un-
dertake any newmodelling, but to use the models they had originally
used in 1998 which had resulted in the estimate of 5.34 metres, albeit
with revised assumptions relating to hydrologic and hydraulic vari-
ables and the ﬂood mitigation capacity of the dams [22]. During the
contractors' technical analysis, the prospect of undertaking Monte
Carlo analyses7 was discussed as an effective means of addressing the
various uncertainties in the models, yet this method was rejected,
apparently due to time constraints [26: p. 50]. The modelling results
were provided in September 2003. The review panel and its con-
tractors determined that the best estimate of Q100 was 3.3 metres,
subsequently adjusted to 3.51 metres, and adjusted yet again in
February 2004 to 3.16 metres.
Although the Commission's reports do not specify what as-
sumptions were used for these estimates, the 2003 expert review
panel report suggests that they were based on assumptions that
the Wivenhoe and Somerset Dams could reduce downstream peak
ﬂood ﬂow rates by about 35% on average8 [22: p. 15]. This as-
sumption contrasted with the operation of the dams during the
2010–2011 ﬂoods, in advance of which the Wivenhoe Dam was at
full supply capacity. Modelling conducted by Seqwater im-
mediately after the 2011 ﬂoods suggested that the ﬂood mitigation
capacity assumed by BCC for their derivation of Q100 would have
required a signiﬁcant pre-emptive reduction below the full supply
capacity of Wivenhoe Dam [27: p. 51].
BCC recommended to civic cabinet that the existing planning
control be maintained at 3.7 metres, as per the rather dubious
terms of reference cited above [26: p. 50]. Despite the review
panel's report recommending that Monte Carlo analysis be un-
dertaken at a later date to address the uncertainties in the model,
no such recommendation was made by BCC to cabinet. The re-
commendation to maintain the existing planning control level was
approved by elected members of Council in December 2003. BCC
concluded that Monte Carlo analysis was considered beyond best
practice, since the existing planning control level (3.7 metres) was
over and above the three Q100 levels provided by the review panel
between September 2003 and February 2004 [26: p. 51].4. Discussion: a political approach to an ‘evidence-based’
decision?
The story recounted above, as investigated by the Commission
of Inquiry and in the context of the analysis provided by Heazle et7 Monte Carlo Analysis is a computational modelling exercise that allows an
input–output model system (such as provided by the hydrologic/hydraulic analyses
of a ﬂood study) to be tested with a large range and number of variable conditions
in order to test the sensitivities and limits of the modelled system.
8 Curiously, the version of the expert review panel report available online
appears to have this value redacted and handwritten in its place “60%” [22: p. 15]. It
is unknown whether the authors or the online publisher made this amendment,
however neither estimate reﬂects the dams’ actual operating ﬂood mitigation ca-
pacity in 2010–2011 [27: p. 51].al. [13] suggests that signiﬁcant political forces were at play in the
technical assessment of environmental risk by local government.
BCC's initial assessment of Q100 (3.7 metres) in 1976 was based on
an assumption of the ﬂood mitigation that would have been pro-
vided by a Wivenhoe Dam, had it been in place during the ﬂooding
events of 1974 [26: p. 48]. However, the Commission of Inquiry
never speciﬁed what precise operating conditions for the dam
were assumed and that had underpinned this estimate. Further,
their ﬁnal estimates of Q100 in 2003–2004 also appear to have
been based on dubious assumptions about the ﬂood mitigation
capacity of the dams in practice. Given the zero-sum game (be-
tween water resources and ﬂood risk management) involved in
the dam's operation, I argue that any assumption concerning the
operation of the Wivenhoe and Somerset Dams constitutes a very
signiﬁcant political decision on the part of BCC where it is used to
inform subsequent metrics of ﬂood risk management and urban
planning.
4.1. BCC's resistance to a precautionary risk-based approach
When BCC sought to update their Q100 estimate in 1996, they
were unhappy with the operating assumptions taken for three
consecutive estimates by both technical contractors and in-house
experts concerning the dam’s operation. The contractors’ initial
precautionary assumption, that the dam would be at Full Supply
Level and thus have the least potential to alleviate ﬂooding, was
deemed unacceptable as a baseline from which to assess the Q100
level for Brisbane’s planning scheme. Yet it was this exact oper-
ating condition9 that was in place during the 2010–2011 ﬂoods
[27: p. 47,,[13].
Clearly then, questions arise about the technical credibility and
legitimacy of the ﬁnal Q100 estimates derived in 2003–2004,
given:
a. The underlying assumption by BCC about the ﬂood risk man-
agement strategy underpinning the operation of Wivenhoe
Dam that was used to assess Q100 was ultimately incorrect – it
conﬂicted with the actual operation of the dam during the
2010–2011 ﬂoods; and,
b. The obvious potential motives of BCC in maintaining a plan-
ning development control level of 6800 m3/s (3.7 metres) at
the Port Ofﬁce gauge, Brisbane, whereby raising the level to
account more realistically for the operation of the dams would
likely have a considerable impact on property values and
further development in the ﬂoodplain [8]; as well as the
circumstantial evidence revealed by the Commission of In-
quiry suggesting that BCC has continually avoided its adjust-
ment in the period 1996–2011 to a more precautionary level
[26: p. 49, 50].
It appears from this analysis that the political decisions made
by state government (concerning the Wivenhoe and Somerset
Dams) and by BCC (concerning the city’s ﬂood risk tolerance)
conﬂicted in ways that ensured that Brisbane's ﬂoodplain com-
munities were more exposed to ﬂooding than they expected to
be. As recounted by [13], an essentially political decision had
been made in the management of the dams by state government,
through the auspices of technical experts in Seqwater and the
state Department of Environment and Resource Management
(DERM) in 2010 to prioritise water supply over ﬂood risk man-
agement in advance of the 2011 ﬂoods. This political decision was9 The responsible State Minister and his advisees decided at the time that the
Wivenhoe Dam could have released 5% of its full supply capacity immediately in
advance of the ﬂoods, but they considered this release would have made a negli-
gible enhancement to the dam’s ﬂood mitigation capacity [27: p. 47].
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the Wivenhoe Dam – and was left in the hands of technical ex-
perts. Notwithstanding the fact that this decision was portrayed
by many in the aftermath of the ﬂoods as technical in-
competence, yet was essentially a political decision [13], it
nonetheless seems a reasonable policy prioritisation given the
Brisbane region’s prolonged drought conditions between 2001
and 2009. Yet this political decision had unexpected (by the
public at least) ramiﬁcations for the degree of exposure to
ﬂooding incurred by communities in the ﬂood plain during the
2010–2011 ﬂoods, because it was in direct conﬂict with the as-
sumptions and political priorities of BCC and their prior assess-
ment of Q100 ﬂood risk.
Given that BCC's priority for spatial planning (in the period
1976–2011) was to optimise development in the ﬂoodplain within
safe limits [4,6,33,37,15,35] then, I argue, this normative prior-
itisation found expression in the derivation of a Q100 level in the
decades prior to 2011 and more speciﬁcally through their as-
sumptions about the operation of the Wivenhoe Dam therein. BCC
appears to have assumed in both their initial (1976) and ﬁnal
(2003–2004) Q100 assessments that either:
a. Dam operators would have sufﬁcient time and operating
ﬂexibility to reduce water levels in advance of ﬂooding events
to allow for the realisation of the assumptions made by BCC
when estimating Q100; or,
b. State government would give greater weighting to ﬂood-risk
management in the operation of Wivenhoe Dam than was
actually the case in practice.
Curiously, the Commission of Inquiry did not specify what
operating assumptions were made concerning the Wivenhoe Dam
for the Council’s ﬁnal estimates in 2003–2004 and appear to have
considered such detail unimportant.10 However, the Commission
does reveal that none of these estimates took a precautionary
approach as per the calculations made by technical experts con-
tracted to advise Council between 1996 and 2000, which had as-
sumed that the dam would be at Full Supply Level. In fact this
precautionary approach appears to have been continually rejected
by BCC.
If the data provided by the DERM in 2003 concerning their
preferred operating capacity of the dams was based on an accurate
assessment of their capacity and ability to release water in the
event of signiﬁcant ﬂooding, then it seems reasonable to surmise
that the ﬁnal Q100 assessment was based on the second of the
aforementioned assumptions about state government's stronger
weighting for ﬂood risk management over water supply, an as-
sumption that aligned with BCC's own political priorities. These
priorities and the assumptions made in pursuit of them were ul-
timately confounded by state government’s actual prioritisation
for water supply made immediately in advance of the 2010–2011
ﬂoods.
This conﬂict of priorities between state government and BCC
meant that, if BCC did deliberately resist changes in their Q100
metric in order to avoid the economic and political ramiﬁcations of
a changing ﬂood risk proﬁle for inner city suburbs, this politici-
sation of expert evidence ultimately backﬁred. Flooding in Bris-
bane in January 2011 resulted in considerable loss of life [27] and
ﬂooded homes lost a signiﬁcant proportion of their value in the
aftermath of the ﬂoods, which in some areas of the city have yet to
fully recover [7,10].10 As discussed in Section 3 above, the 2003 expert review panel report sug-
gests that they were based on assumptions that the dams could reduce down-
stream peak ﬂood ﬂow rates by about 35% on average [22: p. 15].4.2. Political prioritisation through scientisation
Given the apparent motives of BCC, outlined in Section 2.1, for
keeping their Q100 estimate as low as possible, and the evidence
provided by the Commission of Inquiry's investigation, I argue that
BCC have addressed their political priorities through the derivation
of expert evidence in a manner suggesting both the politicisation
of this evidence and a ‘scientised’ climate risk management pro-
cess. Scientisation was a term ﬁrst used by Habermas [11] to elu-
cidate the tensions between expertise and politics and refers to
how decision makers may seek to supress normative decisions or
debate through recourse to objective ‘facts’. Sarewitz [31] and
Weingart [42] have provided the most detailed development of
this concept for environmental decision making. Whereas [31]
assumed for the sake of simplicity that evidence and expertise
provide objective truth about the world and that scientisation
occurs when political decision making or debate are suppressed
through the choice and interpretation of alternative sets of avail-
able facts; the case-study presented here demonstrates that en-
vironmental management practices have become scientised
through the politicisation of evidence development itself. Climate
risk management in Australia has developed under an assumption
that risk assessment can (and should) be determined for policy
making by technical experts [13,23], and BCC’s use of objective
evidence was deemed a necessary component of robust ﬂood risk
management practice in line with the evidence-based mandate
[24] and the associated authority granted in liberal democracies to
privileged expert authority [20]. However this case-study reveals
how this evidence nonetheless requires important normative de-
cisions in its derivation, decisions which appear to have been
deliberately inﬂuenced to align with BCC’s political priorities.
More worrying perhaps is the limited recognition by the
Commission of Inquiry's reports of potential political interference
in state and local governments' technical management of natural
resources, ﬂood risk and urban planning. In its Interim Report, the
Commission’s investigation clearly implicates the relevant state
government minister for his failure to address dam management
in advance of the ﬂoods [13,27: p. 46, 47]. Yet, it failed to in-
vestigate the matter further and subsequently considered such
issues as beyond the scope of its investigation [26]. Furthermore,
although the Commission's investigation appeared to uncover
political inﬂuence in the derivation of BCC's Q100 estimate, it
failed to recognise the important normative link between the
operation of southeast Queensland’s dams and the derivation of
Q100, or to pursue its inquiry further into Q100’s apparent poli-
ticisation [26]. The Commission portrayed such operating as-
sumptions and decisions as purely technical considerations, and
not matters of public policy, suggesting that it too was a mani-
festation of scientised governance: “A ﬂood study is a scientiﬁc in-
vestigation; it involves no matters of policy” [26: p. 41].5. Conclusions
The Commission of Inquiry’s investigation reveals that BCC's
political priorities about the advantages (to the local economy and
to urban spatial planning) of having a Q100 level as low as possible
were in direct conﬂict with competing priorities of state govern-
ment to ensure adequate water supply for the southeast Queens-
land region. As a result of this normative conﬂict, communities on
the ﬂoodplain in Brisbane have been living and working under an
incorrect assumption of ﬂood risk exposure, as expressed through
BCC’s planning scheme and its Deﬁned Flood Level of 3.7 metres at
the Port Ofﬁce gauge in Brisbane, an estimate that has remained
unchanged despite the ﬂooding events of 2010–2011 and the
conﬂicting operating decisions for Wivenhoe Dam that prevailed
P. Tangney / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 14 (2015) 496–503 503at that time [6,27]. That this normative conﬂict was masked by
technical issues relating to dam operations and experts' assess-
ment of Q100, when in fact they required important political de-
cisions about risk prioritisation, tolerability and the relative ex-
posure of communities to climate extremes speaks to the notion of
a scientised planning and policymaking process for climate risk
and natural resource management in southeast Queensland.Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Dr. Michael Marriott for his gen-
erous assistance in the preparation of the ﬁgures used in this
manuscript.
This work was carried out with the ﬁnancial support from the
Australian Government and the National Climate Change Adapta-
tion Research Facility. The views expressed herein are not ne-
cessarily the views of the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth
does not accept responsibility for any information or advice con-
tained herein.References
[1] Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Population Estimates by Local Govern-
ment Area, 2001–2011. 〈http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/De
tailsPage/3218.02011〉, 2012 (accessed 13.08.13).
[2] Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Regional Population Growth, 2013–14 –
Queensland. 〈http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3218.
0Main%20Features302013-14?open
document&tabname¼Summary&prodno¼3218.0&issue¼2013-
14&num¼&view¼〉, 2015 (accessed 18.09.15).
[3] Australian Government, Natural Disasters in Australia. 〈http://www.australia.
gov.au/about-australia/australian-story/natural-disasters〉, 2015 (accessed
22.09.15).
[4] Brisbane City Council (BCC), Superseded Brisbane City Plan 2000. Brisbane
City Council website. 〈http://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au/planning-building/
planning-guidelines-and-tools/superseded-brisbane-city-plan-2000〉, 2000
(accessed 05.11.14).
[5] Brisbane City Council (BCC), Flooding in Brisbane – An Explanation of Tech-
nical Flood Terms. Brisbane City Council website. 〈http://www.brisbane.qld.
gov.au/community/community-safety/disasters-emergencies/types-disasters/
ﬂooding/understand-your-ﬂood-risk〉, 2013 (accessed 14.09.15).
[6] Brisbane City Council (BCC), Brisbane City Plan 2014. Brisbane City Council
website. 〈http://eplan.brisbane.qld.gov.au/CP/〉, 2014 (accessed 05.11.15).
[7] Brisbane Times, House Prices Rebound After Floods, but not in all Suburbs'.
Brisbane Times. 〈http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/house-prices-
rebound-after-ﬂoods-but-not-in-all-suburbs-20140702-zstf9.html〉, July 2,
2014 (accessed 01.10.15).
[8] City Design, Brisbane River Flood Study, Brisbane City Council. 〈http://re
sources.news.com.au/ﬁles/2011/01/20/1225991/887259-110121-brisbane-
ﬂood-study-jun-1999.pdf〉, June 1999 (accessed 01.10.15).
[9] L. Cross, Brisbane Real Estate Prices Four Years after the Floods, Domain.com.
au. 〈http://www.domain.com.au/news/brisbane-real-estate-prices-four-years-
after-ﬂoods-20150111-12iw2a/〉, January 12, 2015 (accessed 30.09.15).
[10] C. Eves, S. Wilkinson, Assessing the immediate and short-term impact of
ﬂooding on residential property participant behaviour, Nat. Hazards 71 (3)
(2014) 1519–1536.
[11] J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, Heinemann, London, 1971.
[12] E. Hawkins, A. Brigden, A. Barton, Integrated water cycle planning: A local
government case study, Australian Planner 45 (2) (2008) 15–17.
[13] M. Heazle, P. Tangney, P. Burton, M. Howes, D. Grant-Smith, K. Reis,
K. Bosomworth, Mainstreaming climate change adaptation: an incremental
approach to disaster risk management in Australia, Environ. Sci. Policy 33
(2013) 162–170.
[14] K. Hennessy, B. Fitzharris, B.C. Bates, N. Harvey, S.M. Howden, L. Hughes, J.
Salinger, J. Warrick, Australia and New Zealand. In: M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P.
Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, C.E. Hanson (Eds.), Climate Change 2007: Im-
pacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
2007. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK, 2007, pp. 507–540.
[15] P. Heywood, Brisbane's development in zones: A review of the 1986 City of
Brisbane Town Plan, Australian Planner 24 (4) (1986) 28–33.
[16] M. Howes, D. Grant-Smith, K. Reis, K. Bosomworth, P. Tangney, M. Heazle, D.
McEvoy, P. Burton, Rethinking Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change
Adaptation. National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Gold Coast,p. 63, 〈http://apo.org.au/sites/default/ﬁles/docs/Howes-2013-rethinking-dis
aster-risk-mngt-WEB.pdf〉, 2013 (viewed 05.08.13).
[17] M. Howes, P. Tangney, K. Reis, D. Grant-Smith, M. Heazle, K. Bosomworth,
P. Burton, Towards networked governance: improving interagency commu-
nication and collaboration for disaster risk management and climate change
adaptation in Australia, J. Environ. Plan. Manag. 58 (5) (2015) 757–776.
[18] B. Jabour, Frankly, Property isn’t Dear Because no-one Promised a Dam. The
Brisbane Times. 〈http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/queensland-
property/frankly-property-isnt-dear-because-noone-promised-a-dam-
20120111-1pv1m.html〉, January 11, 2012 (accessed 01.10.15).
[19] W.R. Johnston, A Documentary History of Queensland, University of Queens-
land Press, St Lucia, 1988.
[20] P. Kitcher, Science in a Democratic Society, Prometheus Books, New York,
2011.
[21] J. McDonald, S. Baum, F. Crick, J. Czarnecki, G. Field, D. Low Choy, J. Mustelin,
M. Sano, S. Serrao-Neumann, Climate change adaptation in South East
Queensland human settlements: Issues and context. Unpublished Report for
the South East Queensland Climate Adaptation Research Initiative, Grifﬁth
University, 2000.
[22] R. Mein, C. Apelt, J. Macintosh, E. Weinmann, Review of Brisbane River Flood
Study – Report to Brisbane City Council, Brisbane City Council. 〈http://re
sources.news.com.au/ﬁles/2011/01/20/1225991/885887-110121-ﬂood-study-
sep-2003.pdf〉, September 3, 2003 (accessed 01.10.15).
[23] National Emergency Management Committee [NEMC], National Emergency
Risk Assessment Guidelines, Attorney-General's Department, Canberra, 2010.
[24] Productivity Commission, Strengthening evidence-based policy in the Aus-
tralian Federation, Volume 1: Proceedings, Roundtable Proceedings, Pro-
ductivity Commission, Canberra, 2010.
[25] Queensland Government, South East Queensland Regional Plan 2009–2031.
Department of Infrastructure and Planning, Brisbane. 〈http://www.dsdip.qld.
gov.au/resources/plan/seq/regional-plan-2009/seq-regional-plan-2009.pdf〉,
2009 (accessed 13.08.13).
[26] Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI), Queensland Floods Com-
mission of Inquiry: Final Report, Brisbane. 〈www.ﬂoodcommission.qld.gov.
au/__data/assets/pdf_ﬁle/0007/11698/QFCI-Final-Report-March-2012.
pdf〉, March 2012 (accessed 10.06.15).
[27] Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (QFCI), Queensland Floods Com-
mission of Inquiry: Interim Report, August 2011, Brisbane. (accessed online
10.06.15) 〈http://www.ﬂoodcommission.qld.gov.au/publications/interimre
port〉, 2011 (accessed 20.11.12).
[28] Queensland Police, Media Release: Death Toll from Queensland Floods. 〈http://
www.police.qld.gov.au/NewsþandþAlerts/MediaþReleases/2011/01/death_
toll_jan24.htm〉, 24 January 2011 (accessed 12.12.12).
[29] Queensland Water Commission, South East Queensland Water Strategy 2010,
Queensland Water Commission, City East, QLD. 〈https://www.dews.qld.gov.
au/__data/assets/pdf_ﬁle/0019/32734/seqws.pdf〉, 2010 (accessed 22.09.15).
[30] G. Readfearn, ‘What does Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott Really Think
About Climate Change? The Guardian. 〈http://www.theguardian.com/environ
ment/planet-oz/2014/jun/16/what-does-australian-prime-minister-tony-ab
bott-really-think-about-climate-change〉, June 16th 2014 (accessed 15.08.14).
[31] D. Sarewitz, How science makes environmental controversies worse, Environ.
Sci. Policy 7 (2004) 385–403.
[32] Seqwater, Historical Dam Storage Data. 〈http://www.seqwater.com.au/water-
supply/dam-levels〉, 2013 (website accessed 22.09.15).
[33] G. Searle, Too concentrated? The planned distribution of residential density in
SEQ, Australian Planner 47 (3) (2010) 135–141.
[34] Seqwater, Water for life – South East Queensland's Water Security Program
2015–2045, Seqwater, Ipswich, QLD. 〈http://www.seqwater.com.au/sites/de
fault/ﬁles/PDF%20Documents/Water%20for%20life_Water%20Security%20Pro
gram.pdf〉, 2015 (accessed 22.09.15).
[35] D.W. Simsion, M.J. Kerry, M.J. Llewellyn-Smith, P. Day, E.A. Borrows, L. Graham,
L. Hegvold, Seminar B: Metropolitan Planning - Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth,
Royal Australian Planning Institute Journal 17 (1) (1979) 97–107.
[36] P. Spearritt, The 200 km city: Brisbane, The Gold Coast and The Sunshine
Coast, Aust. Econ. History Rev. 49 (1) (2009) 87–106.
[37] R. Stimson, S. Taylor, Dynamics of Brisbane's inner city suburbs, Australian
Planner 35 (4) (1998) 205–214.
[38] P. Tangney, Climate Adaptation Policy and Evidence – Understanding the
Tensions Between Politics, Experts and Evidence in Environmental Policy
Making (PhD thesis), Grifﬁth School of Environment, Grifﬁth University,
Brisbane, Australia, 2015 (unpublished).
[39] P. Tangney, M. Howes, 2015. The politics of evidence-based policy: a com-
parative analysis of climate adaptation in Australia and the UK. Environment
and Planning C: Government and Policy (Published online 27.08.15).
[40] K.J. Walker, Australia's construction of environmental policy, in: K. Crowley, K.
J. Walker (Eds.), Environmental Policy Failure: The Australian Story, Tilde
University Press, Vic, Australia, 2012.
[41] K.J. Walker, Environmental Policy in Australia, in: U. Desai (Ed.), Environ-
mental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass, 2002.
[42] P. Weingart, Scientiﬁc expertise and political accountability: paradoxes of
science in politics, Sci. Public Policy 26 (3) (1999) 151–161.
